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Internal Promotion and the Effect of Board Monitoring: A Comparison of Japan and the United States

  • Meg Sato
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    This paper analyses two pronounced features of Japanese corporate governance--large corporate boards almost entirely composed of insiders and the tendency to appoint CEOs through internal promotions. It is often argued that Japanese boards are less effective in monitoring CEOs than U.S. boards which tends to be composed of a small number of directors, majority of which are outsiders. I show that Japanese corporate governance exhibits less inefficiencies than U.S. corporate governance. I further discuss the recent changes in Japanese corporate governance and provide theoretical explanation that they do not necessarily enhance board monitoring.

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    File URL: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/apep-387.pdf
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    Paper provided by Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series Asia Pacific Economic Papers with number 387.

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    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:csg:ajrcau:387
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Canberra ACT 2601
    Phone: (61-2) 6249 3780
    Fax: (61-2) 6249 3941
    Web page: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/research_units/ajrc/
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