Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Bovenberg, A.L. & Teulings, C.N., 2002. "Insurance and Information : Firms as a Commitment Device," Discussion Paper 2002-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989.
"Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1986. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Working Paper 585, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "The Role of Risk in Contract Choice," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 704-736, October.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
- James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
- Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 75-101.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2013.
"Credit within the Firm,"
Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 211-247.
- Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2009. "Credit within the Firm," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd09-097, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Luigi Pistaferri & Luigi Guiso & Fabiano Schivardi, 2010. "Credit within the firm," NBER Working Papers 15924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guiso, Luigi & Pistaferri, Luigi & Schivardi, Fabiano, 2010. "Credit within the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 7793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- L. Guiso & L. Pistaferri & F. Schivardi, 2010. "Credit within the firm," Working Paper CRENoS 201009, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2010. "Credit within the Firm," EIEF Working Papers Series 1008, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Apr 2010.
More about this item
Keywordscommitment; implicit contracts; insurance; moral hazard; principal agent; shirking;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-IAS-2003-02-18 (Insurance Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3441. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.