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What Do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from the Italian Banks

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  • Sapienza, Paola

Abstract

This Paper studies the objective function of state-owned banks. Using information on individual loan contracts, I compare the interest rate charged to two sets of companies with identical characteristics borrowing respectively from state-owned and privately owned banks. State-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do privately owned banks to similar or identical firms, even if the company is able to borrow more from privately owned banks. State-owned banks mostly favour firms located in depressed areas and large firms. The lending behaviour of state-owned banks is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank: the stronger the political party in the area where the firm is borrowing, the lower the interest rates charged. This result is robust to including bank and firm fixed effects.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3168.

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Date of creation: Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3168
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Keywords: government; ownership;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
  • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
  • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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Cited by:

  1. Kleff, Volker & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Payout Policy and Owners? Interests: Evidence from German Savings Banks," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-59, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "Does Local Financial Development Matter?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 929-969.
  3. Alexandre Rands Barros, 2005. "The Impact Of State Owned Banks On Interest Rates Spread," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 041, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  4. Farabullini,F. & Hester,D.D., 2001. "The performance of some recently privatized Italian banks," Working papers 10, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Mariarosaria Agostino & Leone Leonida & Francesco Trivieri, 2005. "Profits persistence and ownership: evidence from the Italian banking sector," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(14), pages 1615-1621.
  6. Acharya, Viral V & Hasan, Iftekhar & Saunders, Anthony, 2002. "The Effects of Focus and Diversification on Bank Risk and Return: Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios," CEPR Discussion Papers 3252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Claeys, Sophie & Vander Vennet, Rudi, 2008. "Determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern Europe: A comparison with the West," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 197-216, June.
  8. Michael Andrews, 2005. "State-Owned Banks, Stability, Privatization, and Growth; Practical Policy Decisions in a World Without Empirical Proof," IMF Working Papers 05/10, International Monetary Fund.

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