P2P Lending: Information Externalities, Social Networks and Loans' Substitution
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Curatola, Giuliano & Faia, Ester, 2016. "Divergent Risk-Attitudes and Endogenous Collateral Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 11678, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kenneth L. Judd, 1998. "Numerical Methods in Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262100711.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997.
"Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," Working papers 95-1, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995.
"Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral," Papers 152, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, June.
- Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Laura Veldkamp, 2010.
"Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 779-805.
- Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Laura Veldkamp, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification," NBER Working Papers 13904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laura Veldkamp & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification," Working Papers 08-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Menahem E. Yaari, 1965. "Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 137-150.
- Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012.
"Securitized banking and the run on repo,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
- Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2009. "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo," NBER Working Papers 15223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2009. "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2358, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2009.
- Martin Ruckes, 2004. "Bank Competition and Credit Standards," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(4), pages 1073-1102.
- Seth M. Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2011. "Learning by Doing with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Prosper.com," NBER Working Papers 16855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Paravisini, Daniel & Rappoport, Veronica & Ravina, Enrichetta, 2016. "Risk aversion and wealth: evidence from person-to-person lending portfolios," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62137, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bertsch, Christoph & Hull, Isaiah & Zhang, Xin, 2016. "Fed Liftoff and Subprime Loan Interest Rates: Evidence from the Peer-to-Peer Lending Market," Working Paper Series 319, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
- J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, 1978. "Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 323-336.
- Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
- Jefferson Duarte & Stephan Siegel & Lance Young, 2012. "Trust and Credit: The Role of Appearance in Peer-to-peer Lending," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(8), pages 2455-2484.
More about this item
Keywordsliquidity shocks; peer-to-peer lending; pooling equilibria; signals; value of information;
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BAN-2017-09-03 (Banking)
- NEP-BIG-2017-09-03 (Big Data)
- NEP-NET-2017-09-03 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2017-09-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2017-09-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12235. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.