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The decentralization of Social Assistance and the rise of Disability Insurance enrolment

Author

Listed:
  • Gijs Roelofs

    (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

  • Daniël van Vuuren

    () (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

Abstract

In this paper, we assess spillover effects of Social Assistance (SA) decentralization in the Netherlands, in particular towards (a centrally administered) Disability Insurance scheme (DI). DI enrolment has increased strongly since the decentralization of SA. Many economists and policymakers believe that fiscal decentralization, the decentralization of government expenditures to local governments, enhances public sector efficiency. Vertical externalities – i.e. spillovers between local and central government – may however undo part of this advantage. In this paper, we assess spillover effects of Social Assistance (SA) decentralization in the Netherlands, in particular towards (a centrally administered) Disability Insurance scheme (DI). DI enrolment strongly increased since the decentralization of SA. We find that the sensitivity of local DI enrolment with respect to the stock of local SA recipients has increased over time, given that we control for both observed and unobserved disability risk factors. IV estimates show that, since the decentralization of SA, at least one third of DI inflow was diverted from SA.

Suggested Citation

  • Gijs Roelofs & Daniël van Vuuren, 2011. "The decentralization of Social Assistance and the rise of Disability Insurance enrolment," CPB Discussion Paper 185, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:185
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. van Sonsbeek, Jan-Maarten & Alblas, Ridwan, 2012. "Disability benefit microsimulation models in the Netherlands," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 700-715.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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