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Estimación del precio marginal del sistema eléctrico colombiano: una mirada desde la organización industrial

Author

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  • Ona Duarte Venslauskas
  • John J. Garc�a

Abstract

This paper has two important goals. The first one is to build a Cournot model that illustrate the strategic behavior of the leader energy generators of the Colombian energy market, using the spot price as a strategic variable to estimate the optimal quantities of the short term energy market. The second goal is to use the quantities estimated to build industrial organizational variables, and with them estimate the spot price using VAR models, that allow an impulse response analysis. A daily series is used for the estimation, which it goes from June of 2010 until November of the same year. The results showed that the storage capacity of the hydraulic companies give them a higher strategic behavior that thermal companies when the demand level is low, but the opposite happens when the demand level is high. It was found that a random shock over the residual demand of the oligopoly and the concentration ratio of the market structure, are reflected in a fluctuated behavior of the spot energy price, this effect can be read as a reaction of the companies to the new circumstances of the market condition. ****** El artículo tiene dos principales objetivos. El primero es construir un modelo de Cournot que simule el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas generadoras líderes del mercado eléctrico colombiano, usando el Precio Marginal del Sistema (PMS) como variable estratégica para determinar las cantidades optimas a ofertar en el mercado spot. El segundo es usar las cantidades estimadas con el modelo de Cournot para construir variables de organización industrial (Índice de Demanda Residual y el Índice de Herfindahl e Hirschman) y con ellas estimar modelos vectoriales autorregresivos (VAR) que permitan estimar el PMS y hacer análisis de impulso respuesta. Los modelos se estiman para la serie diaria desde junio del 2010 hasta noviembre del mismo ano. Los resultados muestran que la capacidad de almacenamiento de las empresas hidráulicas permite un mayor comportamiento estratégico que el de una empresa térmica cuando la demanda es baja, mientras que las térmicas son más estratégicas cuando la demanda es alta dado que los recursos de generación hidráulica se ven reducidos. Además se encuentra que los choques sobre los cambios en la capacidad de maniobra del oligopolio y en la concentración del mercado, se reflejan en un comportamiento fluctuante sobre el crecimiento del PMS, lo que se puede interpretar como una reacción de la estrategia de las empresas ante un cambio en las circunstancias de organización del mercado.

Suggested Citation

  • Ona Duarte Venslauskas & John J. Garc�a, 2014. "Estimación del precio marginal del sistema eléctrico colombiano: una mirada desde la organización industrial," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 12582, Universidad EAFIT.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000122:012582
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10784/5024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Modelo de Cournot; Precio Marginal del Sistema; mercado eléctrico; Índice dedemanda residual; Índice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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