IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/col/000093/011066.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mecanismos utilizados para monitorear el poder de mercado en mercados eléctricos: reflexiones para Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Jesús Alonso Botero
  • John Jairo Garc�a
  • Luis Guillermo V�lez

Abstract

El propósito de este trabajo es analizar la viabilidad de la utilización del índice de oferta residual (IOR) en el mercado eléctrico mayorista en Colombia, con el fin de promover la competencia. Esto se hace a partir de la revisión de la literatura relacionada con las experiencias internacionales respecto a los mecanismos para monitorear el poder de mercado y del análisis del Documento 118 de la Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG, 2010). La principal conclusión es que el IOR no es un buen mecanismo de control en mercados hidráulicos, mientras que el desarrollo de los mercados de largo plazo ha sido utilizado con gran éxito para mitigar el riesgo de abuso de poder de mercado, según lo muestra la experiencia internacional. ***** This paper investigates the viability of using the Residual Supply Index (RSI) to promote market competition in the Colombian electrical pool. The evaluation is based on a literature review of international experiences of power market monitoring mechanisms and an analysis of CREG Document No. 118 produced by the Colombian Commission for the Regulation of Energy and Gas (CREG). The principal conclusions of the review are that the RSI is not a good control mechanism in hydric markets, and that international evidence shows that the development of long-run markets has been used very successfully to mitigate the risk of market power abuse. ***** Le propos de cette étude est d’analyser la viabilité de l’utilisation de l’indice d’offre résiduelle [IOR] sur le marché de gros de l’électricité en Colombie afin de determiner le degré de concurrence et d’en favoriser son expansion. L’étude part d’une révision de la littérature concernant les expériences internationales de mécanismes de surveillance de la force de marché et sur une analyse du Document 118 de la Commission de régulation de l’électricité et du gaz [CREG, 2010]. La principale conclusion est que l’IOR n’est pas un bon mécanisme de controle des marchés hydrauliques, alors que le développement des marchés a long terme a été utilisé avec succes pour atténuer les risques d’abus de pouvoir de marché, comme le montrent diverses expériences internationales.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesús Alonso Botero & John Jairo Garc�a & Luis Guillermo V�lez, 2013. "Mecanismos utilizados para monitorear el poder de mercado en mercados eléctricos: reflexiones para Colombia," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000093:011066
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.fce.unal.edu.co/media/files/documentos/Cuadernos/60/finales/v32n60a09.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arnedillo, Oscar, 0. "What Does the Evidence Really Say about the Residual Supply Index?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 57-64, January.
    2. Fabra, Natalia & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Bergman, Lars, 2006. "Why has the Nordic electricity market worked so well?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 148-157, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alex Pérez & Jaime Carabal�, 2021. "Un modelo sobre competencia en mercados de electricidad: contratos bilaterales en Colombia," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, vol. 87(5).
    2. Perez, Alex & Garcia-Rendon, John J., 2021. "Integration of non-conventional renewable energy and spot price of electricity: A counterfactual analysis for Colombia," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 146-161.
    3. Juan Pablo Botero Duque & John J. Garc�a & Hermilson Vel�squez, 2016. "Efectos del cargo por confiabilidad sobre el precio spot de la energía eléctrica en Colombia," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, vol. 35(68), pages 491-519.
    4. Ona Duarte Venslauskas & John J. García Rendón, 2015. "Estimación del precio marginal del sistema eléctrico colombiano: una mirada desde la organización industrial," Revista Ecos de Economía, Universidad EAFIT, vol. 19(41), pages 1-23, December.
    5. John J. García & Santiago Arango Tamayo & Andr�s F. Ortiz Rico, 2015. "Impacto de la regulación en la eficiencia asignativa del mercado spot eléctrico colombiano," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 13313, Universidad EAFIT.
    6. John J. García Rendón & Alex F. P�rez-Libreros, 2019. "El precio spot de la electricidad y la inclusión de energía renovable no convencional: evidencia para Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 17393, Universidad EAFIT.
    7. John J. García & Jes�s L�pez-Rodr�guez & Jhonny Moncada-Mesa, 2017. "Spatial effects in the bid price setting strategies of the wholesale electricity markets: The case of Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 15660, Universidad EAFIT.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jesús Alonso Botero & John Jairo Garc�a & Luis Guillermo V�lez, 2013. "Mecanismos utilizados para monitorear el poder de mercado en mercados eléctricos: reflexiones para Colombia," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    2. Arnedillo Blanco, Oscar, 2011. "¿Es competitivo el mercado eléctrico español? Indicadores de abuso de poder de mercado y aplicación al caso de España/Is the Spanish Electricity Wholesale Market Competitive? Indicators of Abuse of Do," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 29, pages 627-654, Agosto.
    3. Lyu, Chenyan & Do, Hung Xuan & Nepal, Rabindra & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2024. "Volatility spillovers and carbon price in the Nordic wholesale electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    4. Söderholm, Patrik & Wårell, Linda, 2011. "Market opening and third party access in district heating networks," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 742-752, February.
    5. Vesterberg, Mattias, 2017. "Power to the people: Electricity demand and household behavior," Umeå Economic Studies 942, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    6. Mulder, Machiel & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2013. "Decomposing changes in competition in the Dutch electricity market through the residual supply index," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 100-107.
    7. Bataille, Marc & Steinmetz, Alexander & Thorwarth, Susanne, 2014. "Screening instruments for monitoring market power in wholesale electricity markets: Lessons from applications in Germany," DICE Discussion Papers 150, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    8. Frowin Schulz & Karl Mosler, 2011. "The effect of infrequent trading on detecting price jumps," AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis, Springer;German Statistical Society, vol. 95(1), pages 27-58, March.
    9. Mauritzen, Johannes, 2012. "Dead Battery? Wind Power, the Spot Market, and Hydro Power Interaction in the Nordic Electricity Market," Working Paper Series 908, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Faisal Mehmood Mirza & Olvar Bergland, 2016. "Market Power in the Norwegian Electricity Market: Are the Transmission Bottlenecks Truly Exogenous?," The Energy Journal, , vol. 37(2), pages 27-44, April.
    11. Sandsmark, Maria, 2009. "A regional energy paradox--the case of Central Norway," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4549-4556, November.
    12. Genc, Talat S., 2016. "Measuring demand responses to wholesale electricity prices using market power indices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 247-260.
    13. Farzad Hassanzadeh Moghimi & Hanna Ek Fälth & Lina Reichenberg & Afzal S. Siddiqui, 2023. "Climate Policy and Strategic Operations in a Hydro-Thermal Power System," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(5), pages 67-94, September.
    14. Matti Liski & Iivo Vehviläinen, 2016. "Gone with the Wind? An Empirical Analysis of the Renewable Energy Rent Transfer," CESifo Working Paper Series 6250, CESifo.
    15. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19124 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Joseph Mullins & Liam Wagner & John Foster, 2010. "Price Spikes in Electricity Markets: A Strategic Perspective," Energy Economics and Management Group Working Papers 05, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    17. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2010. "Electricity Market Reform: Lessons for developing countries," MPRA Paper 27317, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Vahid Arabzadeh & Peter D. Lund, 2020. "Effect of Heat Demand on Integration of Urban Large-Scale Renewable Schemes—Case of Helsinki City (60 °N)," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-17, May.
    19. Richard Meade & Seini O’Connor, 2011. "Comparison of Long-term Contracts and Vertical Integration in Decentralized Electricity Markets," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & Petter Vegard Hansen, 2010. "Electricity Retailing in Norway," The Energy Journal, , vol. 31(1), pages 25-46, January.
    21. Oseni, Musiliu O. & Pollitt, Michael G., 2014. "Institutional arrangements for the promotion of regional integration of electricity markets : international experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6947, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    poder de mercado; experiencias internacionales; diseño de mercado; Documento 118 CREG; Colombia.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000093:011066. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Facultad de Ciencias Economicas Unal (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/funalco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.