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Efectos del cargo por confiabilidad sobre el precio spot de la energía eléctrica en Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pablo Botero Duque
  • John J. Garc�a
  • Hermilson Vel�squez

Abstract

Este artículo considera el efecto del cargo por confiabilidad sobre el precio spot de la energía eléctrica en Colombia, implementado en 2006 con el fin de incentivar a los generadores existentes o a los nuevos inversionistas para mejorar la confiabilidad de la prestación del servicio, lo que conduce a incrementar la capacidad instalada en el mercado de energía mayorista. Se describe el funcionamiento de este mecanismo en Colombia y se analiza el comportamiento de algunas variables estructurales en el funcionamiento de este mercado, como la relación entre la demanda comercial y la disponibilidad real, el fenómeno de El Nino y La Nina, el nivel de embalse y algunas medidas de carácter regulatorio. El precio spot presenta alta volatilidad haciendo que la especificación adecuada corresponda a un modelo de regresión con estructura ARCH. Los resultados obtenidos evidencian que el cargo por confiabilidad es estadísticamente significativo y positivo, es decir, hace que el precio spot aumente. Además, El Nino presenta un impacto positivo sobre el precio spot, debido a la gran participación hidráulica de este mercado. ***** This paper considers the effect of electricity generation reliability on the spot price of the electricity market in Colombia, a mechanism implemented in 2006 to encourage existing generators or new investors to increase the installed capacity in the wholesale energy market. We describe the performance of this mechanism in Colombia and analyse the behaviour of some structural variables in the operation of this market, such as the ratio between the market demand and the actual availability, El Nino and La Nina, the reservoir level, and some regulation measures. The spot price presents high volatility implying that the proper specification corresponds to a regression model with ARCH structure (Engle, 1982). Results show that the reliability charge is positive and statistically significant. Also, El Nino has a positive impact on the spot price, due to the large hydraulic share of this market.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pablo Botero Duque & John J. Garc�a & Hermilson Vel�squez, 2016. "Efectos del cargo por confiabilidad sobre el precio spot de la energía eléctrica en Colombia," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, vol. 35(68), pages 491-519.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000093:014176
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. John J. García & Santiago Arango Tamayo & Andr�s F. Ortiz Rico, 2015. "Impacto de la regulación en la eficiencia asignativa del mercado spot eléctrico colombiano," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 13313, Universidad EAFIT.
    2. José Camilo Juvinao Navarro, 2021. "Lecciones del Cargo por Confiabilidad en Colombia como un mecanismo de incentivo a la generación de energía eléctrica," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, vol. 87(4).
    3. David Rios & Alex Perez & Jaime Carabali & Luis Meneses, 2024. "Poder de mercado y eventos climáticos adversos en un mercado de electricidad hidro-dominado," Borradores de Economia 1266, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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