On the Robustness of Laissez-Faire
This paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their type: their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods. While preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an agent's private type, we assume that the planner/government is both uncertain about the nature of this joint distribution and unable to choose among multiple equilibria of any given social mechanism. We model the planner/government as having a maxmin objective in the face of this uncertainty. Our main theorem is as follows: Once we allow for this kind of uncertainty and assume no wealth effects in preferences, the uniquely optimal social contract is laissez-faire, in which agents trade in unfettered markets with no government intervention of any kind.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001.
"Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 523-542.
- Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1999. "Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage," Staff Report 238, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Harold L Cole & Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010. "Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1909, David K. Levine.
- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003.
"Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms,"
1372, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society.
- Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
- Christopher Phelan & Marco Bassetto, 2004.
2004 Meeting Papers
375, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, 1992.
"On Efficient Distribution With Private Information,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 427-453.
- Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
- Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
- Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000165. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.