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On the Robustness of Laissez-Faire

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  • Narayana Kocherlakota
  • Christopher Phelan

Abstract

This paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their type: their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods. While preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an agent's private type, we assume that the planner/government is both uncertain about the nature of this joint distribution and unable to choose among multiple equilibria of any given social mechanism. We model the planner/government as having a maxmin objective in the face of this uncertainty. Our main theorem is as follows: Once we allow for this kind of uncertainty and assume no wealth effects in preferences, the uniquely optimal social contract is laissez-faire, in which agents trade in unfettered markets with no government intervention of any kind.
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Suggested Citation

  • Narayana Kocherlakota & Christopher Phelan, 2007. "On the Robustness of Laissez-Faire," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000165, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000165
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    File URL: http://www.econ.umn.edu/~nkocher/laissezfaire.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Felix J., Bierbrauer, 2011. "On the optimality of optimal income taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2105-2116, September.
    2. Weinzierl, Matthew, 2014. "The promise of positive optimal taxation: normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 128-142.
    3. Gadi Barlevy, 2011. "Robustness and Macroeconomic Policy," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24, September.
    4. Cosmin L. Ilut & Martin Schneider, 2022. "Modeling Uncertainty as Ambiguity: a Review," NBER Working Papers 29915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Lockwood, Benjamin B. & Weinzierl, Matthew, 2015. "De Gustibus non est Taxandum: Heterogeneity in preferences and optimal redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 74-80.
    6. Ohanian, Lee E. & Prescott, Edward C. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2009. "Introduction to dynamic general equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2235-2246, November.
    7. Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Anil Nathan & Justin Svec, 2013. "Student Uncertainty and Major Choice," Working Papers 1301, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    9. , G., 2013. "Managing pessimistic expectations and fiscal policy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    10. Svec, Justin, 2012. "Optimal fiscal policy with robust control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 349-368.
    11. Kindy R. Sjahrir, 2018. "Formulating Regional Competitiveness Fiscal Policy based upon Leverage Factors for Indonesian Data," Working Papers in Economics and Development Studies (WoPEDS) 201804, Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University, revised Dec 2018.
    12. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 2701, CESifo.
    13. Lensman, Todd & Troshkin, Maxim, 2022. "Implications of uncertainty for optimal policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    14. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.
    15. Felix Bierbrauer, 2010. "On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3163, CESifo.

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