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Myths of the Great War

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  • Harrison, Mark

    (University of Warwick and CAGE)

Abstract

We review some “myths” of the Great War of 1914 to 1918: that the war broke out inadvertently, that the western front saw needless slaughter, that the Allies used the food weapon to strangle Germany, and that the peace treaty that ended the war caused the rise of Hitler and the still greater war that followed.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrison, Mark, 2014. "Myths of the Great War," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 188, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:188
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    File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/188-2014_harrison.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. King, Gary & Rosen, Ori & Tanner, Martin & Wagner, Alexander F., 2008. "Ordinary Economic Voting Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 951-996, December.
    2. Hantke, Max & Spoerer, Mark, 2010. "The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany’s armed forces, 1924–1929," MPRA Paper 20054, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Matthias Blum, 2013. "War, food rationing, and socioeconomic inequality in Germany during the First World War," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 66(4), pages 1063-1083, November.
    4. Ian Gazeley & Andrew Newell, 2013. "The First World War and working-class food consumption in Britain," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 17(1), pages 71-94, February.
    5. Broadberry,Stephen & Harrison,Mark (ed.), 2005. "The Economics of World War I," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521852128.
    6. Max Hantke & Mark Spoerer, 2010. "The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany's armed forces, 1924–9," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 63(4), pages 849-864, November.
    7. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    8. van Riel, Arthur & Schram, Arthur, 1993. "Weimar Economic Decline, Nazi Economic Recovery, and the Stabilization of Political Dictatorship," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 71-105, March.
    9. White, Eugene N., 2001. "Making the French pay: The costs and consequences of the Napoleonic reparations," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 337-365, December.
    10. Webb, Steven B., 1986. "Fiscal News and Inflationary Expectations in Germany after World War I," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 769-794, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harrison, Mark, 2020. "Economic Warfare in Twentieth-Century History and Strategy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 468, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic mobilization; hyperinflation; interdependence; rational calculation; strategic interaction; reparations; war of attrition.;
    All these keywords.

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