Performance-Based Incentives for Health: Six Years of Results from Supply-Side Programs in Haiti
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
- Rena Eichler & Paul Auxila & John Pollock, 2001. "Output-Based Health Care : Paying for Performance in Haiti," World Bank Publications - Reports 11370, The World Bank Group.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, "undated". "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Martin Chalkley & Andrew J. Mirelman & Luigi Siciliani & Marc Suhrcke & Peter Berman, 2020.
"Paying for Performance for Health Care in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: An Economic Perspective,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Paul Revill & Marc Suhrcke & Rodrigo Moreno-Serra & Mark Sculpher (ed.), Global Health Economics Shaping Health Policy in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, chapter 6, pages 157-190,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Martin Chalkley & Andrew Mirelman & Luigi Siciliani & Marc Suhrcke, 2016. "Paying for performance for health care in low- and middle-income countries: an economic perspective," Working Papers 140cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
- Lewis, Maureen & Pettersson, Gunilla, 2009. "Governance in health care delivery : raising performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5074, The World Bank.
- Charles Kenny, William Savedoff, 2013. "Can Results-Based Payments Reduce Corruption?-Working Paper 345," Working Papers 345, Center for Global Development.
- Aryankhesal, Aidin & Sheldon, Trevor A. & Mannion, Russell, 2014. "Impact of the Iranian hospital grading system on hospitals’ adherence to audited standards: An examination of possible mechanisms," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 206-214.
- Magrath, Priscilla & Nichter, Mark, 2012. "Paying for performance and the social relations of health care provision: An anthropological perspective," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 75(10), pages 1778-1785.
- Caryl Feldacker & Aaron F Bochner & Amy Herman-Roloff & Marrianne Holec & Vernon Murenje & Abby Stepaniak & Sinokuthemba Xaba & Mufata Tshimanga & Vuyelwa Chitimbire & Shingirai Makaure & Joseph Hove , 2017. "Is it all about the money? A qualitative exploration of the effects of performance-based financial incentives on Zimbabwe's voluntary male medical circumcision program," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(3), pages 1-15, March.
- Hapsatou Touré & Martine Audibert & François Dabis, 2010. "To what extent could performance-based schemes help increase the effectiveness of prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT) programs in resource-limited settings? A summary of the publ," Post-Print inserm-00617221, HAL.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2011.
"Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard when the Quantity and Quality of Children are Stochastic,"
CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(2), pages 349-364, June.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic," CHILD Working Papers wp13_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa, 2009. "Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard, When the Quantity and Quality of Children Are Stochastic," IZA Discussion Papers 4179, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Zhen Wang & Tomislav Vukina, 2017. "Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(3), pages 219-249, April.
- Honglin Li & Xiaolu Liu, 2021. "Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 27-47, September.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018.
"Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions,"
Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
- Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022.
"The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 2423-2470, August.
- Opp, Marcus & Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2020. "The economics of deferral and clawback requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 15081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2022. "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 16882, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- James M. Malcomson, 2011.
"Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 83-120, March.
- James Malcomson, 2009. "Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model," Economics Series Working Papers 453, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- James Malcomson, 2010. "Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 2943, CESifo.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2016.
"An envelope approach to tournament design,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "An envelope approach to tournament design," ECON - Working Papers 184, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2015.
- Baomin Dong & Guixia Guo & Frank Yong Wang, 2013. "Dynamic Moral Hazard and Executive Stock Options," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 259-279, May.
- Ohad Kadan & Philip J. Reny & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2017.
"Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal‐Agent Problems,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 769-823, May.
- Philip J. Reny & Jeroen Swinkels & Ohad Kadan, 2011. "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems," Working Papers 2011-002, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Sexton, Richard J., 1994. "A Survey of Noncooperative Game Theory with Reference to Agricultural Markets: Part 2. Potential Applications in Agriculture," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(02), pages 1-18, August.
- Budde, Jörg, 2013. "Good news and bad news in subjective performance evaluation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 444, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
- Lang, Matthias, 2019.
"Communicating subjective evaluations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
- Matthias Lang, 2012. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Apr 2018.
- Lang, Matthias, 2018. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 120, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo.
- Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Munich Reprints in Economics 78243, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023.
"Optimal technology design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.
- Garrett, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118115, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi, 2014. "Bankers' compensation: : Sprint swimming in short bonus pools?," Research Discussion Papers 2/2014, Bank of Finland.
- Martin Byford, 2003.
"Moral Hazard From Costless Hidden Actions,"
Working Papers
2003.03, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Martin Byford, 2003. "Moral Hazard From Costless Hidden Actions," Working Papers 2003.03 EDIRC Provider-In, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Andrea Lodi & Enrico Malaguti & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses & Tommaso Bonino, 2016. "Design and Control of Public-Service Contracts and an Application to Public Transportation Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 1165-1187, April.
- Lee, Hangsuck & Ha, Hongjun & Lee, Minha, 2024. "A sharing rule for multi-period interest-sensitive insurance contracts," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Health; Haiti;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DEV-2007-08-27 (Development)
- NEP-HEA-2007-08-27 (Health Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Publications Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cgdevus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.