Paying for performance and the social relations of health care provision: An anthropological perspective
Over the past decade, the use of financial incentive schemes has become a popular form of intervention to boost performance in the health sector. Often termed “paying for performance” or P4P, they involve “…the transfer of money or material goods conditional upon taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target” (Eldridge & Palmer, 2009, p.160). P4P appear to bring about rapid improvements in some measured indicators of provider performance, at least over the short term. However, evidence for the impact of these schemes on the wider health system remains limited, and even where evaluations have been positive, unintended effects have been identified. These have included: “gaming” the system; crowding out of “intrinsic motivation”; a drop in morale where schemes are viewed as unfair; and the undermining of social relations and teamwork through competition, envy or ill feeling. Less information is available concerning how these processes occur, and how they vary across social and cultural contexts.
Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 10 ()
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