IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Transferable Ageing Provisions in Individual Health Insurance Contracts

  • Florian Baumann
  • Volker Meier


  • Martin Werding

We consider lifetime health insurance contracts in which ageing provisions are used tosmooth the premium profile. The capital stock accumulated for each individual can bedecomposed into two parts: a premium insurance and an annuitised life insurance, onlythe latter being transferable between insurers without triggering premium changesthrough risk segmentation. In a simulation based on German data, the transferable sharedeclines in age and falls with an increasing age of entry into the contract. In spite ofdifferent benefit profiles, it is almost identical for women and men.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its series Ifo Working Paper Series with number Ifo Working Paper No. 32.

in new window

Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_32
Contact details of provider: Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Meier, Volker, 2005. "Efficient transfer of aging provisions in private health insurance," Munich Reprints in Economics 19184, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Cochrane, John H, 1995. "Time-Consistent Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 445-73, June.
  3. Bradley Herring & Mark Pauly, 2003. "Incentive-Compatible Guaranteed Renewable Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9888, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2003. "The Role Of Commitment In Dynamic Contracts: Evidence From Life Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 299-327, February.
  5. Kifmann, Mathias, 2002. "Insuring Premium Risk in Competitive Health Insurance Markets," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 15, number urn:isbn:9783161477409.
  6. Frick, Kevin D, 1998. "Consumer Capital Market Constraints and Guaranteed Renewable Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 271-78, July-Aug..
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.