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The Future of Eurozone Fiscal Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Anne-Laure Delatte
  • Clemens Fuest
  • Daniel Gros
  • Friedrich Heinemann
  • Martin Kocher
  • Roberto Tamborini

Abstract

This paper discusses various options for reforming fiscal governance in the Eurozone. We focus on two possible reform approaches referred to as the ‘Maastricht model’ and the ‘US model’. The Maastricht model implies that ultimate responsibility for economic and fiscal policy remains at the national level. The US model, by contrast, calls for the development of much stronger European institutions. In both cases some degree of policy coordination, a European Banking Union and insolvency procedures for sovereigns are indispensable. We discuss the challenges and trade-offs involved and argue that certain elements of the two approaches which combine increased risk sharing with increased market discipline and risk reduction could be combined to achieve a more resilient and economically successful Eurozone.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne-Laure Delatte & Clemens Fuest & Daniel Gros & Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Kocher & Roberto Tamborini, 2017. "The Future of Eurozone Fiscal Governance," EconPol Policy Reports 1, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:econpr:_1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung & Agnieszka Markiewicz, 2013. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 59(3), pages 449-488, September.
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    4. Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It work? And Are There Really 'No Alternatives'?," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(1), pages 03-09, April.
    5. Wickens, Michael R., 2016. "Is there an alternative way to avoid another eurozone crisis to the Five Presidents' Report?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Feld, Lars P. & Fuest, Clemens & Haucap, Justus & Schweitzer, Heike & Wieland, Volker & Wigger, Berthold U., 2016. "Dismantling the boundaries of the ECB's monetary policy mandate: The CJEU's OMT judgement and its consequences," Kronberger Kreis-Studien 61e, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
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    10. Wickens, Michael, 2016. "Is there an alternative way to avoid another eurozone crisis to the Five Presidents' Report?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 156-165.
    11. Luc Eyraud & Vitor Gaspar & Tigran Poghosyan, 2017. "Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area," IMF Working Papers 17/18, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Ashoka Mody, 2013. "A Schuman compact for the euro area," Essays and Lectures 802, Bruegel.
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