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Negative Tax Incidence with Multiproduct Firms

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  • Anna D'Annunzio
  • Antonio Russo

Abstract

A fundamental result in the theory of commodity taxation is that taxes increase consumer prices and reduce supply, aggravating the distortions caused by market power. This result hinges on the assumption that each firm provides a single product. We study the effects of commodity taxes in presence of multiproduct firms that have market power. We consider a monopolist providing two goods and obtain simple conditions such that an ad valorem tax reduces the prices and increases the supply of both goods, thereby increasing total surplus. We show that these conditions can hold in a variety of settings, including add-on pricing, multiproduct retailing with price advertising, intertemporal models with switching costs and two-sided markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna D'Annunzio & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Negative Tax Incidence with Multiproduct Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 9881, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9881
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anna D'Annunzio & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Welfare-Enhancing Taxation and Price Discrimination," CESifo Working Paper Series 10007, CESifo.
    2. Antoniades, Alexis & Clerides, Sofronis & Xu, Mingzhi, 2023. "Multi-product firm price and variety response to firm-specific cost shocks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    commodity taxation; tax incidence; multi-product firms; monopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence

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