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Redistributive Capital Taxation Revisited

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  • Özlem Kina
  • Ctirad Slavik
  • Hakki Yazici

Abstract

This paper shows that capital-skill complementarity provides a quantitatively significant rationale to tax capital for redistributive governments. The optimal capital income tax rate is 60%, which is significantly higher than the optimal rate of 48% in an identically calibrated model without capital-skill complementarity. The skill premium falls from 1.9 to 1.67 along the transition following the optimal reform in the capital-skill complementarity model, implying substantial indirect redistribution from skilled to unskilled workers. These results show that a government that cares about redistribution should take into account capital-skill complementarity in production when setting the tax rate on capital income.

Suggested Citation

  • Özlem Kina & Ctirad Slavik & Hakki Yazici, 2020. "Redistributive Capital Taxation Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 8627, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8627
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    3. Dusan Stojanovic, 2023. "Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: Implications for Income and Wealth Inequality," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp760, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capital taxation; capital-skill complementarity; inequality; redistribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E25 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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