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The Effective Rate of Interest on Target Balances

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  • Hans-Werner Sinn

Abstract

While the formal decision of the ECB Council to impose interest on Target claims and liabilities is meaningless, this paper shows that the pooling of primary interest income among national central banks in the Eurozone implies that Target and cash balances do, in fact, bear an effective rate of interest. The magnitude of this effective rate of interest is given by a weighted average of the ECB’s policy interest rates where (i) the relative country sizes and (ii) the uses of alternative sources and sinks of international liquidity flows determine the weights. Without countervailing transactions, which would effectively service the Target claims and liabilities, Target balances grow with compound interest. The payment of interest on Target balances internalizes the competitive externality that otherwise could induce excessive money supply in a decentralized monetary system of the kind characterizing the Eurozone. It also implies that the recording of Target balances in the balance sheets of national central banks is compatible with fair value accounting.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans-Werner Sinn, 2019. "The Effective Rate of Interest on Target Balances," CESifo Working Paper Series 7878, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7878
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7878_2.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
    2. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    3. Itamar Drechsler & Thomas Drechsel & David Marques-Ibanez & Philipp Schnabl, 2016. "Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1933-1974, October.
    4. Aizenman, Joshua & Cheung, Yin-Wong & Qian, XingWang, 2020. "The currency composition of international reserves, demand for international reserves, and global safe assets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Christopher J. Neely, 2017. "Chinese Foreign Exchange Reserves, Policy Choices, and the U.S. Economy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 99(2).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Sinn Hans-Werner, 2019. "Der Streit um die Targetsalden : Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel „Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?“," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 170-217, September.
    2. David Blake, 2023. "Target2: The Silent Bailout System That Keeps the Euro Afloat," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(12), pages 1-126, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Target2; ECB; interest; competitive seignorage externality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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