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Tax Policy in a Model of Search with Training


  • Jan Boone
  • Ruud A. De Mooij


This paper develops a model of search on the labour market with training. The model reveals how the tax system can restore the social optimum if the Hosio s condition is not satisfied in the private equilibrium. Furthermore, the effects are explored of a second-best reform from average to marginal taxes when a given amount of public revenue has to be raised. We find that (i) a marginal wage tax is less distortionary to raise revenue than is an average tax per job, provided that training is not distorted initially; (ii) this conclusion may reverse in the presence of training distortions; (iii) marginal wage taxes are less distortionary in economies characterized by commitment in wage bargaining, such as the European labour market. Hence, tax reforms that reduce the average tax per job and raise the marginal wage tax, such as an EITC or a negative income tax, are more attractive in Europe than in the US.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Boone & Ruud A. De Mooij, 2000. "Tax Policy in a Model of Search with Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 232, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_232

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher, 2001. "Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labour Market Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Bovenberg, A. Lans & Graafland, Johan J. & de Mooij, Ruud A., 2000. "Tax reform and the Dutch labor market: an applied general equilibrium approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 193-214, October.
    3. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
    4. Robert Haveman, 1995. "Reducing Poverty while Increasing Employment: A Primer on Alternative Strategies, and a Blueprint," OECD Jobs Study Working Papers 7, OECD Publishing.
    5. Nada Eissa & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1996. "Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 605-637.
    6. Bovenberg, A. Lans & van Ewijk, Casper, 1997. "Progressive taxes, equity, and human capital accumulation in an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 153-179, May.
    7. Dupor, Bill, et al, 1996. "Some Effects of Taxes on Schooling and Training," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 340-346, May.
    8. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
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    10. James Heckman & Lance Lockner & Christopher Taber, 1999. "Human capital formation and general equilibrium treatment effects: a study of tax and tuition policy," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(1), pages 25-40, March.
    11. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-849, November.
    12. Broersma, Lourens & Van Ours, Jan C., 1999. "Job searchers, job matches and the elasticity of matching," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 77-93, March.
    13. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier.
    14. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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    17. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
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    Cited by:

    1. Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2007. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 867-884, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General


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