Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes
The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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- S¯ren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-M¯ller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003.
"Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition,"
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- Søren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller & Guttorm Schjelderup, . "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Nielsen, Søren Bo & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schjederup, Guttorm, 2000. "Formula Apportionment And Transfer Pricing Under Oligopolistic Competition," Working Papers 18-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Søren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2001. "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 491, CESifo Group Munich.
- Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000.
"Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting,"
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- Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting," Munich Reprints in Economics 20419, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Guttorm Schjelderup & Lars Sorgard, 1997. "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 277-290, July.
- Sanna-Randaccio, Francesca & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 2002. "Multinational Knowledge Spillovers with Centralized versus Decentralized R&D: A Game Theoretic Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Michael L. Katz, 1991.
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RAND Journal of Economics,
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- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
- Nielsen, Søren Bo & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2010. "Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 121-132, January.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, B & Picard, P, 1995.
"Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 621-46, May.
- Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno & Picard Pierre, 1991. "Competing vertical structures : precommitment and renegotiation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9125, CEPREMAP.
- Laixun Zhao, 2000. "Decentralization and Transfer Pricing Under Oligopoly," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 414-426, July.
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