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Outside Employment and Parliamentary Priorities

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Listed:
  • Klaus Gründler
  • Niklas Potrafke

  • Timo Wochner

Abstract

Many democracies allow their legislators to engage in private employment, but the consequences for parliamentary priorities are still poorly understood. We collect large-scale longitudinal data on outside employment and biographic characteristics for all members of the 18th German Bundestag, and link this information to all spoken words and voting behavior in parliament. We present novel evidence that outside employment is associated with parliamentary priorities. Legislators address topics of sectors from which they receive private income more often, are more positive about these sectors, and take a generally more pro-industry stance in legislation. Our results have important implications regarding the independence of legislators.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Gründler & Niklas Potrafke & Timo Wochner, 2025. "Outside Employment and Parliamentary Priorities," CESifo Working Paper Series 12016, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12016
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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