Does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates ?
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country, using the French experience. We estimate a model of tax setting for local business tax using spatial and dynamic econometric techniques, for the period 1993-2003. We find first that reducing the number of municipalities is likely to limit tax competition and increase local business tax rates as a consequence. Second, we find that tax rates are higher when groups of localities set a single business tax rate rather than applying an additional rate of business tax, suggesting that horizontal tax competition constrains the level of tax rate increase generated by tax-base sharing.
|Date of creation:||15 Jan 2010|
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