GOVERNANCE RISKS. How to measure them by means of the incremental cash-flow model
Governance risks stem from the own governance of any organization. The paper puts forward an operational viewpoint of those risks, by mapping the most distinctive categories of governance analysis onto time-dependent governance variables. Afterwards, risks conveyed by the latter are measured against incremental cash flows. The procedure allows a joint analysis of the risky positions carried out by governance variables, tracking them down onto their natural drivers, the incremental cash flows related to assets, creditors, managers, stockholders, and the company’s portfolio of non-current financial assets
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
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- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003.
"Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," NBER Working Papers 9813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2007. "Factoring governance risk into investors´expected rates of return by means of a weighted average governance index," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 356, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "Incremental cash flows, information sets and conflicts of interest," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 220, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 1999. "The Cash Flow Model with Float: A New Approach to Deal with Valuation and Agency Problems," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 247-279, November.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 1999. "A Corporate Finance Cash Flow model with Float," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 142, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2008. "Who is the ultimate master of contractual, regulatory, discretionary and residual cash flows? An answer from the standpoint of corporate governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 368, Universidad del CEMA.
- Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "The Governance Slack Model. A Cash Flow Approach for the Budgeting and Accountability of some Corporate Governance Issues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 212, Universidad del CEMA.
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