IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cem/doctra/368.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Who is the ultimate master of contractual, regulatory, discretionary and residual cash flows? An answer from the standpoint of corporate governance

Author

Listed:
  • Rodolfo Apreda

Abstract

This paper sets forth a framework of analysis that links contractual, discretionary, regulatory and residual cash flows with decision rights over them. To attain this purpose, firstly we introduce the standard incremental cash flow model, underlying its main limitations. Secondly, we move on bringing to light cash flows to senior management and directors, as well as the so-often neglected investment portfolio. Next, we settle down to what we are going to call the compact cash flow model that comprises five building blocks, namely those arising out of assets, those addressed to owners, creditors, managers and directors, and lastly the company’s investment portfolio. Afterwards, contractual, discretionary, regulatory and residual cash flows are enlarged upon. Last of all, we focus on decision rights over every constituent of each building block. This issue carries weight in Corporate Governance since stakeholders who claim or exercise decision rights, also could trespass on the rules of the game, becoming better off to the expense and damage of other stakeholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodolfo Apreda, 2008. "Who is the ultimate master of contractual, regulatory, discretionary and residual cash flows? An answer from the standpoint of corporate governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 368, Universidad del CEMA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:368
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/368.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    2. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
    3. Rodolfo Apreda, 2007. "Stakeholders, transactional environments and conflict systems (mapping on why the founding charter compact becomes the mainstay of corporate governance)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 346, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "How corporate governance and globalization can run afoul of the law and good practices in business: The Enron's disgraceful affair," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 225, Universidad del CEMA.
    5. Rodolfo Apreda, 1999. "The Cash Flow Model with Float: A New Approach to Deal with Valuation and Agency Problems," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 247-279, November.
    6. Rodolfo Apreda, 2007. "How the logic and pragmatics of sinking funds play a part in corporate governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 351, Universidad del CEMA.
    7. Rodolfo Apreda, 1999. "The Cash Flow Model with Float: A New Approach to Deal with Valuation and Agency Problems," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 2, pages 247-279, November.
    8. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Propping and tunneling," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 732-750, December.
    9. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    10. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    12. Rodolfo Apreda, 2003. "THE SEMANTICS OF GOVERNANCE. (The common thread running through corporate, public, and global governance.)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 245, Universidad del CEMA.
    13. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rodolfo Apreda, 2011. "GOVERNANCE RISKS. How to measure them by means of the incremental cash-flow model," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 467, Universidad del CEMA.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195, November.
    2. Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Corporate Rent-Seeking and the managerial soft-budget constraint," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 283, Universidad del CEMA.
    3. Cook, Douglas O. & Chowdhury, Jaideep & Zhang, Weiwei, 2023. "Director optimism and CEO equity compensation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 143-162.
    4. Daniel Cohen & Bin Li & Ningzhong Li & Yun Lou, 2022. "Major government customers and loan contract terms," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 275-312, March.
    5. James C. Sesil & Yu Peng Lin, 2011. "The Impact of Employee Stock Option Adoption and Incidence on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. Panel Data," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 514-534, July.
    6. Scherer, F.M., 2019. "Managerial Control and Executive Compensation," Working Paper Series rwp19-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    7. Basu, Debarati & Sen, Kaustav, 2015. "Financial decisions by business groups in India: Is it “fair and square”?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 121-137.
    8. Dietl, Helmut M. & Duschl, Tobias & Lang, Markus, 2011. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 1-30, August.
    9. Cécile Cézanne, 2010. "Un modèle renouvelé de gouvernance d'entreprise : une évaluation empirique sur données françaises," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 120(4), pages 669-700.
    10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    11. Bernile, Gennaro & Jarrell, Gregg A., 2009. "The impact of the options backdating scandal on shareholders," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1-2), pages 2-26, March.
    12. Costello, Anna M., 2013. "Mitigating incentive conflicts in inter-firm relationships: Evidence from long-term supply contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 19-39.
    13. Kang, Hyung Cheol & Anderson, Robert M. & Eom, Kyong Shik & Kang, Sang Koo, 2017. "Controlling shareholders' value, long-run firm value and short-term performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 340-353.
    14. Yen, Tze-Yu & Andre, Paul, 2007. "Ownership structure and operating performance of acquiring firms: The case of English-origin countries," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(5), pages 380-405.
    15. Yan-Leung Cheung & In-Mu Haw & Weiqiang Tan & Wenming Wang, 2014. "Board Structure and Intragroup Propping: Evidence from Family Business Groups in Hong Kong," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 569-601, September.
    16. Benson, Bradley W. & Lian, Qin & Wang, Qiming, 2016. "Stock ownership guidelines for CEOs: Do they (not) meet expectations?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 52-71.
    17. Mª Belén Lozano García, 2011. "Analyzing the Effect of Excess Cash Accumulation on Financial Decisions," Post-Print hal-00704672, HAL.
    18. Qaiser Rafique Yasser & Abdullah Al Mamun, 2017. "The Impact of Ownership Concentration on Firm Performance: Evidence from an Emerging Market," Emerging Economy Studies, International Management Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 34-53, May.
    19. Taekjin Shin, 2012. "CEO Compensation and Shareholder Value Orientation Among Large US Firms," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 43(4), pages 535-559.
    20. Victor Chen & Jing Li & Daniel Shapiro, 2011. "Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 115-138, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:368. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Valeria Dowding (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cemaaar.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.