The Shapley value for bicooperative games
The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (2000), we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value.
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- Jesús Mario Bilbao & Julio R. Fernández & Nieves Jiménez & Jorge Jesús López, 2004. "Probabilistic values for bicooperative games," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/54, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
471R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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