Probabilistic values for bicooperative games
The present paper develops some general conditions under which we analize the bicooperative games introduced by Bilbao (2000). We define the probabilistic values for these games and observe in detail the axioms that characterize such values. Following the work of Weber (1988), these axioms are sequentially introduced observing how they have repercussions on the probabilistic value expression. Also, we introduce the compatible-order values and show the relationship between these values and the efficiency values such that their components are probabilistic values.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Robert J. Weber, 1977.
"Probabilistic Values for Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
471R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pradeep Dubey & Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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