Antitrust in two-sided markets: Is competition always desirable?
The main objective of antitrust interventions is to assure competition in markets to benefit consumers. This paper challenges this common approach by examining the case of a satellite broadcasting network with monopoly power. First, satellite TV is identified as a two-sided market. It is then analyzed in the framework of the canonical model for two-sided markets developed by Rochet & Tirole (2004). The main finding is that the satellite network maximizes his profits by choosing a price formation which maximizes the overall welfare of all market participants. Even if the satellite network uses his monopoly power to introduce a fee to receive satellite TV, it would do so only until the semi-elasticity of the amount of consumers in regard to the per-interaction-price equals the one of the TV stations â€“ exactly the point where welfare is maximized. It is therefore concluded that antitrust cases have to take a more in-depth look at two-sided markets before deciding that competition is best for consumers.
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- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003.
"Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, 06.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform competition in two sided markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24929, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 152, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," FMG Discussion Papers dp409, Financial Markets Group.
- Schmidtke, Richard, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities," Discussion Papers in Economics 963, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Schmidtke, Richard, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 133, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Evans David S., 2003. "Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-19, September.
- Richard Schmidtke, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1776, CESifo Group Munich.
- repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:645-667 is not listed on IDEAS
- Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities," Discussion Papers in Economics 478, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, 2005. "Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(10), pages 1494-1504, October.
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