The Accident Externality from Driving
We estimate auto accident externalities (more specifically insurance externalities) using panel data on state-average insurance premiums and loss costs. Externalities appear to be substantial in traffic dense states: in California, for example, we find that a typical additional driver increases the total of other peopleâ€™s insurance costs by $2231 per year. In such states, an increase in traffic density dramatically increases aggregate insurance premiums and loss costs. In contrast, the accident externality per driver in low traffic states appears quite small. On balance, accident externalities are so large that a correcting Pigouvian tax could raise $45 billion annually in California alone, and over $140 billion nationally. The extent to which this externality results from increases in accident rates, accident severity or both remains unclear. It is also not clear whether the same externality pertains to underinsured accident costs like fatality risk.
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- Aaron S. Edlin, 1999.
"Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance,"
Law and Economics
- Aaron S. Edlin, 1999. "Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aaron S. Edlin., 1999. "Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance," Economics Working Papers 99-262, University of California at Berkeley.
- Aaron S. Edlin, 2003. "Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance," Law and Economics 0303001, EconWPA.
- Christopher J. Ruhm, 1995.
"Alcohol Policies and Highway Vehicle Fatalities,"
NBER Working Papers
5195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, 2001. "How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1198-1237, December.
- Jerry Green, 1976. "On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 553-574, Autumn.
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