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Oil rents, governance quality, and the allocation of talents in developing countries

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  • Luc Désiré OMGBA
  • Christian EBEKE

Abstract

Evidence shows that the allocation of talented people is not neutral for growth. Thus, a country with a large population of law concentrators tends to develop rent-seeking activities that reduce growth. A country with a large population of engineers tends to foster innovation and strengthen growth. But what determines the allocation of talents? This question has not yet been empirically examined. This paper contributes to fill this gap. Based on a sample of 69 developing countries the paper highlights that oil rents determine the allocation of talents but this effect is not linear. It largely depends on the quality of governance. While, oil rents in well governed countries tend to orient talents towards productive activities, oil rents in badly governed countries tend to orient talents towards rent-seeking activities. These results are robust to different specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Désiré OMGBA & Christian EBEKE, 2011. "Oil rents, governance quality, and the allocation of talents in developing countries," Working Papers 201123, CERDI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Venables, Anthony J. & Maloney, William & Kokko, Ari & Bravo Ortega, Claudio & Lederman, Daniel & Rigobón, Roberto & De Gregorio, José & Czelusta, Jesse & Jayasuriya, Shamila A. & Blomström, Magnus & , 2011. "Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 350, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Okey K. N. Mawussé, 2013. "Institutions and scientific research in Africa," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1487-1503.
    2. Driouchi, Ahmed, 2014. "Testing of Natural Resources as Blessing or Curse to the Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries," MPRA Paper 58598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gaëlle Tatiana TIMBA & Douzounet MALLAYE & Urbain Thierry YOGO, 2015. "Oil Rent and Income Inequality in Developing Economies: Are They Friends or Foes?," Working Papers 201502, CERDI.
    4. Driouchi, Ahmed & Harkat, Tahar, 2016. "Knowledge Economy, Global Innovation Indices, Rents and Governance in Arab Economies," MPRA Paper 73507, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Mireille NTSAMA ETOUNDI, 2014. "Impact de la rente pétrolière sur la demande des pays frontaliers du Cameroun," Working Papers 201417, CERDI.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking; occupational choice; oil rents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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