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An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game

Author

Listed:
  • Georgalos, Konstantinos

    (Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School)

  • Gonçalves, Ricardo

    (Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa)

  • Ray, Indrajit

    (Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University)

  • SenGupta, Sonali

    (Department of Economics, Queen’s Business School, Queen’s University Belfast)

Abstract

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value ‘wallet game’. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour: instead of bidding according to the Nash equilibrium, subjects appear to rely on expected value (EV) bidding. As a consequence, observed auction prices are higher than the theoretical benchmark, and the winner’s curse occurs in a substantial fraction of auctions. We analyse bidding behaviour in detail and discuss the implications of our findings

Suggested Citation

  • Georgalos, Konstantinos & Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit & SenGupta, Sonali, 2025. "An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2025/25, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2025/25
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Castro, Manuel, 2017. "Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 28-40.
    2. Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024. "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(1), pages 125-150, February.
    3. James Cox & Sam Dinkin & James Swarthout, 2001. "Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 163-181, October.
    4. Charness, Gary & Levin, Dan & Schmeidler, David, 2019. "An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 73-98.
    5. Ricardo Gonçalves & John Hey, 2018. "Experimental Evidence On English Auctions: Oral Outcry Versus Clock," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Experiments in Economics Decision Making and Markets, chapter 20, pages 427-466, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1983. "A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 205-219.
    7. Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 177-179.
    8. James C. Cox & Duncan James, 2012. "Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 883-903, March.
    9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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