A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism
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Cited by:
- Hossain Tanjim & Morgan John, 2006.
"...Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-30, January.
- Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, 2006. "...plus shipping and handling: Revenue (non) equivalence in field experiments on ebay," Natural Field Experiments 00270, The Field Experiments Website.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005.
"Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Working Papers 03002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Rasch, Alexander & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2016.
"Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding,"
VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change
145849, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Rasch, Alexander & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2017. "Preferences and decision support in competitive bidding," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Cary A. Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Fixed Revenue Auctions: Theory And Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 342-354, July.
- Alexander L. Brown & Charles R. Plott & Heidi J. Sullivan, 2009. "Collusion Facilitating And Collusion Breaking Power Of Simultaneous Ascending And Descending Price Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 395-424, July.
- Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Theory And Misbehavior Of First-Price Auctions: The Importance Of Information Feedback In Experimental Markets," Experimental 0503008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo, 2003. "Winner's curse without overbidding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 625-644, August.
- Sascha Füllbrunn & Dirk‐Jan Janssen & Utz Weitzel, 2019. "Risk Aversion And Overbidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 631-647, January.
- Cary Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2020. "Auctions in near-continuous time," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 110-126, March.
- Söllner, Matthias, 2008. "Menschliches Verhalten in elektronischen Märkten," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 34, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
- Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrés Romeu, 2011. "Cluster Detection in Laboratory Auction Data: A Model-Based Approach," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(4), pages 473-488, December.
- Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 183-204, January.
- Cary Deck & Jungmin Lee & Javier Reyes, 2015. "Are subjects making financial decisions in lab auctions or are they just gambling?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 228-232, February.
- Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
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