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Adaptation and Influence: The Schumpeterian Perspective on Business-Politics Relations

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  • Thomas Paster

Abstract

This paper introduces Schumpeter’s views on the relationship between business and politics and argues that we can discern a distinct Schumpeterian perspective of business-politics relations. Schumpeter’s views about the pivotal role of entrepreneurs in economic development attracted substantial interest in economic sociology and in political economy. His views about the role of entrepreneurs in politics have so far however hardly been studied. The paper identifies the following four aspects as central to Schumpeter’s perspective of business-politics relations: (a) entrepreneurs and corporations drive economic change, (b) entrepreneurs and corporations are ineffective in defending their political interests and vulnerable to hostile movements, (c) the resulting divergence of the economic and the political impact of entrepreneurs and corporations makes capitalism socio-politically instable, and (d) the relationship of entrepreneurs and corporations to political institutions and public policies is primarily adaptive, rather than causative. The paper proposes a two-dimensional typology of business-politics relations that combines the Schumpeterian focus on adaptation with the Marxian focus on influence. These two dimensions - adaptation and influence - result in four ideal types: business-dominated social compromise, imposed social compromise, business dominance, and political confrontation. Examples from German welfare state history illustrate these four types. The paper suggests that the Schumpeterian and the Marxian perspective, while in contrast to each other, may be complementary and each perspective valid under different socio-political conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Paster, 2016. "Adaptation and Influence: The Schumpeterian Perspective on Business-Politics Relations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 444, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mizruchi, Mark S., 2013. "The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, number 9780674072992, Spring.
    2. Kinderman, Daniel, 2014. "Challenging varieties of capitalism's account of business interests: The new social market initiative and German employers' quest for liberalization, 2000-2014," MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/16, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Paster, Thomas, 2011. "German employers and the origins of unemployment insurance. Skills interest or strategic accommodation?," MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Paster, Thomas, 2015. "Bringing power back in: A review of the literature on the role of business in welfare state politics," MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, 2002. "Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State," Politics & Society, , vol. 30(2), pages 277-325, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    business and politics; Joseph A. Schumpeter; welfare state politics; political economy of entrepreneurship; history of economic ideas.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P12 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Enterprises
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy

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