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"Bank Centrality" and Money Creation
[« Centralité bancaire » et émission monétaire]

Author

Listed:
  • François-Xavier Dudouet

    (IRISSO - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Sciences Sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres)

  • Eric Grémont

    (OpesC - Observatoire politico-économique des structures du Capitalisme)

  • Antoine Vion

    (LEST - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Sociologie du Travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

For more than one century, interlocking directorate studies have provided evidence of bank centrality in corporate networks. Many interpretations of this phenomenon have been elaborated, but none of them was conclusive. In this paper, we assume that theoretical and methodological limits have affected this literature. Firstly, two usual confusions have been to assimilate bank centrality to bank control and to study corporate networks from the perspective of a sum of links rather than the one of a whole structure. Secondly, scholars have paid attention to immediate financial relations between bank and industry, such as credit and shareholding, but not to financial intermediation and money creation. We think that economic theory of money creation is worth bringing back in. From such a theoretical perspective, bank centrality seems to be better understood as a form of collegial regulation of money creation, while the absence of such a phenomenon indicates the rise of bureaucratic regulation by central banks and global financial institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • François-Xavier Dudouet & Eric Grémont & Antoine Vion, 2014. ""Bank Centrality" and Money Creation [« Centralité bancaire » et émission monétaire]," Working Papers halshs-01095256, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01095256
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01095256
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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