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Paying a ‘Fair Share’: Multinational Corporations’ Perspectives on Taxation

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  • Ainsley Elbra
  • John Mikler

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  • Ainsley Elbra & John Mikler, 2017. "Paying a ‘Fair Share’: Multinational Corporations’ Perspectives on Taxation," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8(2), pages 181-190, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:2:p:181-190
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521134132.
    8. Elbra, Ainsley D., 2014. "Interests need not be pursued if they can be created: private governance in African gold mining," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 247-266, August.
    9. Glen Dowell & Stuart Hart & Bernard Yeung, 2000. "Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(8), pages 1059-1074, August.
    10. Andre Gunder Frank, 1978. "Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-16014-3.
    11. Pauly, Louis W. & Reich, Simon, 1997. "National structures and multinational corporate behavior: enduring differences in the age of globalization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 1-30, January.
    12. Ronen Palan & Duncan Wigan, 2014. "Herding Cats and Taming Tax Havens: The US Strategy of ‘Not In My Backyard’," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 5(3), pages 334-343, September.
    13. David L. Levy & Peter J. Newell, 2002. "Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance: Toward a Neo-Gramscian Synthesis," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 84-101, November.
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