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Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: The post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US

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  • Lisa Kastner

    (Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Dodd–Frank, the financial reform law passed in the United States in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Kastner, 2017. "Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: The post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US," Post-Print hal-02186320, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02186320
    DOI: 10.1080/17448689.2017.1299336
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-02186320
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bastiaan Redert, 2020. "Stakeholder Mobilization in Financial Regulation: A Comparison of EU Regulatory Politics over Time," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(6), pages 1433-1451, November.
    2. Coban, Mehmet Kerem, 2020. "Diffuse interest groups and regulatory policy change: Financial consumer protection in Turkey," OSF Preprints f6t5y, Center for Open Science.

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