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From Outsiders to Insiders: A Civil Society Perspective on EU Financial Reforms

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  • Lisa Kastner

    (Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

This article examines the role of non-financial interest groups in EU financial regulatory decisionmaking. While regulatory capture theories clearly helped identify the causes for the incrementality in spite of the major shock the 2008 crisis had caused, this article will consider a range of regulatory policy initiatives that do not neatly conform with this theory. I examine the extent to which nonfinancial groups are able to have their preferences met in the making of three different consumer policies: the Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD), stricter regulations of retail investment products (PRIPs/KID) and the reform of EU level supervisory structures. By employing a process-tracing approach based on qualitative interviews to analyze political responses to the 2008 financial crisis, the article demonstrates that newly mobilized groups could translate key advocacy goals into policy by deploying counter-expertise and co-operating with policy-makers in some cases but not in others.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Kastner, 2017. "From Outsiders to Insiders: A Civil Society Perspective on EU Financial Reforms," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02184200, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-02184200
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12644
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02184200
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lisa Kastner, 2014. "‘Much ado about nothing?’ Transnational civil society, consumer protection and financial regulatory reform," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02186500, HAL.
    2. Jennifer Clapp & Eric Helleiner, 2012. "Troubled futures? The global food crisis and the politics of agricultural derivatives regulation," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 181-207.
    3. Lisa Kastner, 2014. "‘Much ado about nothing?’ Transnational civil society, consumer protection and financial regulatory reform," Post-Print hal-02186500, HAL.
    4. Cornelia Woll, 2013. "Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02186537, HAL.
    5. Simon Steinlin & Christine Trampusch, 2012. "Institutional shrinkage: The deviant case of Swiss banking secrecy," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 242-259, June.
    6. Kevin Young, 2012. "Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 663-688.
    7. Agnes Orban, 2016. "Mobilizing moral boundaries: the politics of derivatives reform in the US," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 555-573, November.
    8. Cornelia Woll, 2013. "Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on E uropean U nion Hedge Fund Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 555-572, May.
    9. Wooley, John T. & Ziegler, J. Nicholas, 2011. "The Two‐Tiered Politics of Financial Reform in the United States," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt2k3219pt, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    10. Lisa Kastner, 2014. "'Much ado about nothing?' Transnational civil society, consumer protection and financial regulatory reform," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 1313-1345, December.
    11. Cornelia Woll, 2013. "Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation," Post-Print hal-02186537, HAL.
    12. Kevin Young, 2013. "Financial industry groups' adaptation to the post‐crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(4), pages 460-480, December.
    13. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929.
    14. Stefano Pagliari & Kevin L. Young, 2014. "Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 575-610, June.
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9og5h9g9qi is not listed on IDEAS
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    Keywords

    Consumer finance protection; Financial crisis; Interest groups; Lobbying;
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