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Financial industry groups' adaptation to the post‐crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle

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  • Kevin Young

Abstract

This article explores the advocacy efforts of financial industry groups since the financial crisis. I describe key changes in the post‐crisis financial regulatory environment and argue that financial industry groups have adapted their advocacy strategies to these new conditions in innovative ways. Faced with a more challenging environment, financial industry groups have shifted their emphasis along the different stages of the policy cycle. Specifically, increased issue salience and a strained policy network have weakened financial industry groups' capacity to veto regulatory proposals at the stage of actual policy formulation. Focusing on the advocacy strategies of the global banking and derivatives industries, I show evidence that the response has been to invest in more subtle advocacy strategies which focus on other stages of the policymaking cycle. Self‐regulatory moves attempt to affect the agenda setting stage of policymaking, and a strong focus on the timing, rather than the content of new regulations, has attempted to affect the implementation stage. Such a transformation of advocacy strategies differs sharply from most depictions of financial industry groups simply “blocking” regulatory change since the global financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Young, 2013. "Financial industry groups' adaptation to the post‐crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(4), pages 460-480, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:7:y:2013:i:4:p:460-480
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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