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Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance

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  • Lucia Quaglia
  • Aneta Spendzharova

Abstract

Post‐crisis international standards have been agreed on in certain areas of banking regulation, namely capital, liquidity, and resolution, but not others, namely bank structure – why? We articulate a two‐step analytical framework that links the domestic and international levels of governance. In particular, we focus on the role of domestic regulators at the interface between the two levels. At the domestic level, regulators evaluate externalities and adjustment costs before engaging in cooperation at the international level. This analysis explains why regulators in the United States and the European Union act as pacesetters, foot‐draggers, or fence‐sitters in international standard setting; that is to say, why they promote, resist, or are neutral toward international financial standards. At the international level, we explain the outcome of international standard setting by considering the interaction of pacesetters and foot‐draggers.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucia Quaglia & Aneta Spendzharova, 2017. "Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 422-437, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:11:y:2017:i:4:p:422-437
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12157
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    Cited by:

    1. Haselmann, Rainer & Sarkar, Arkodipta & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "The political economy of financial regulation," LawFin Working Paper Series 45, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    2. Lucia Quaglia & Aneta Spendzharova, 2023. "Explaining the EU’s Uneven Influence Across the International Regime Complex in Shadow Banking," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(2), pages 6-16.

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