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Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium

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  • Posner, Elliot

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  • Posner, Elliot, 2009. "Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(04), pages 665-699, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:63:y:2009:i:04:p:665-699_99
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirsten Rodine-Hardy, 2016. "Nanotechnology and Global Environmental Politics: Transatlantic Divergence," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, pages 89-105.
    2. repec:spr:revint:v:12:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9268-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Helleiner, Eric & Pagliari, Stefano, 2011. "The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(01), pages 169-200, January.
    4. Moloney, Niamh, 2017. "The European Union in international financial governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65180, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Beck, Stefan & Scherrer, Christoph, 2014. "Das transatlantische Handels- und Investitionsabkommen (TTIP) zwischen der EU und den USA," Arbeitspapiere 303, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.
    6. Young Kevin, 2015. "Not by structure alone: power, prominence, and agency in American finance," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, pages 443-472.
    7. Carney Richard, 2011. "The Domestic Political Origins of Global Financial Standards: The Agrarian Roots of American Securities Regulations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, pages 1-41.
    8. Hilgers, Sven, 2014. "Manager of financial globalization? The European Union in global anti-money laundering and international accounting standard setting," PIPE - Papers on International Political Economy 22/2014, Free University Berlin, Center for International Political Economy.
    9. Ramon Pacheco Pardo, 2014. "EU–China relations in financial governance: cooperation, convergence or competition?," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, pages 63-77.

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