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The political economy of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions

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  • Lucia Quaglia

Abstract

The development of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions highlights an intriguing puzzle: the European Union (EU), which is often considered as a ‘great financial power’, had a marginal influence in the standard-setting process, which was led by the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Why? This paper brings together and further develops the concepts of cross-border externalities derived from the hierarchical network structure of the international financial system and domestic regulatory capacity. The US and the UK had the incentives (externalities) to promote and the domestic capacity to shape international standards. By contrast, the EU was mainly exposed to regional (intra-EU) cross-border externalities and lacked regulatory capacity on the matter. Paradoxically, international standards contributed to developing EU resolution capacity by facilitating an agreement on EU (and later on, euro area) rules.

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  • Lucia Quaglia, 2017. "The political economy of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(5), pages 595-609, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:22:y:2017:i:5:p:595-609
    DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2017.1270927
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. International Monetary Fund, 2011. "People's Republic of China: Financial System Stability Assessment," IMF Staff Country Reports 2011/321, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Daniel W. Drezner, 2007. "Bringing the Great Powers Back In, from All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes," Introductory Chapters, in: All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schuknecht, Ludger & Siegerink, Vincent, 2020. "The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Stefano Pagliari & Meredith Wilf, 2021. "Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 933-951, July.
    3. Lucia Quaglia & Aneta Spendzharova, 2017. "Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 422-437, December.

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