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Bulls, Bears and Excess Volatility: can currency intervention help?

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  • Corrado, L.
  • Miller, M.
  • Zhang, L.

Abstract

Asset mis-pricing may reflect investor psychology, with excess volatility arising from switches of sentiment. For a floating exchange rate where fundamentals follow a random walk, we show that excess volatility can be generated by the repeated entry and exit of currency `bulls' and `bears' with switches driven by `draw-down' trading rules. We argue that non-sterilised intervention - in support of `monitoring band' - can reduce excess volatility by coordinating beliefs in line with policy. Strategic complementarity in the foreign exchange market suggests that sterilised intervention may also play a coordinating role.

Suggested Citation

  • Corrado, L. & Miller, M. & Zhang, L., 2007. "Bulls, Bears and Excess Volatility: can currency intervention help?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0708, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0708
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul De Grauwe & Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, 2007. "Modeling Optimism and Pessimism in the Foreign Exchange Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 1962, CESifo.
    2. Michael Melvin & Lukas Menkhoff & Maik Schmeling, 2008. "Automating Exchange Rate Target Zones: Intervention via an Electronic Limit Order Book," CESifo Working Paper Series 2221, CESifo.
    3. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01011701, HAL.
    4. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Post-Print halshs-01215947, HAL.
    5. Liu, Yi-Fang & Zhang, Wei & Xu, Chao & Vitting Andersen, Jørgen & Xu, Hai-Chuan, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 407(C), pages 204-215.
    6. Ronald McDonald & Xuxin Mao, 2016. "Japan's Currency Intervention Regimes: A Microstructural Analysis with Speculation and Sentiment," Working Papers 2016_06, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    7. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Post-Print halshs-00983051, HAL.
    8. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & J{o}rgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2013. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Papers 1311.4274, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2014.
    9. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00983051, HAL.
    10. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01215947, HAL.
    11. Yi-Fang Liu & Wei Zhang & Chao Xu & Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Hai-Chuan Xu, 2014. "Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14031, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monitoring Rules; Monitoring Band; Bear and Bull Traders; Excess Volatility; Central Bank Intervention.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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