IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bsl/wpaper/2004-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate Governance, Unternehmensbewertung und Wettbewerb : eine Untersuchung für die Schweiz

Author

Listed:
  • Zimmermann, Heinz

    (University of Basel)

  • Beiner, Stefan
  • Drobetz, Wolfgang
  • Schmid, Markus

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Zimmermann, Heinz & Beiner, Stefan & Drobetz, Wolfgang & Schmid, Markus, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Unternehmensbewertung und Wettbewerb : eine Untersuchung für die Schweiz," Working papers 2004/01, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2004/01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/18347/1/corporate_governance.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kang, Jun-Koo & Stulz, Rene M, 1996. "How Different Is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 109-139.
    2. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    3. Nickell, Stephen J, 1996. "Competition and Corporate Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 724-746, August.
    4. Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 275-287, May.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    6. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    8. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October.
    9. Eugene F. Fama, 2002. "Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "On the economics and politics of corporate finance and corporate control," Papers 98-43, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    12. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    13. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    15. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July.
    16. Schmidt, Reinhard H & Spindler, Gerald, 2002. "Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 311-333, Winter.
    17. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    18. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
    19. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    20. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    21. Grosfeld, Irena & Tressel, Thierry, 2001. "Competition, Corporate Governance: Substitutes or Complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange," CEPR Discussion Papers 2888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-585, June.
    23. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chi, Jianxin Daniel & Scott Lee, D., 2010. "The conditional nature of the value of corporate governance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 350-361, February.
    2. Nicolas Kohl & Wolfgang Schaefers, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: Evidence from Europe," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 362-393, April.
    3. Harvey, Campbell R. & Lins, Karl V. & Roper, Andrew H., 2004. "The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 3-30, October.
    4. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    5. Doocheol Moon & Kishore Tandon, 2007. "The influence of growth opportunities on the relationship between equity ownership and leverage," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 339-351, November.
    6. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, December.
    7. Wolfgang Drobetz & Pascal Pensa & Markus M. Schmid, 2007. "Estimating the Cost of Executive Stock Options: evidence from Switzerland," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 798-815, September.
    8. Becker, Bo & Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2011. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 907-942, August.
    9. Fosu, Samuel, 2013. "Capital structure, product market competition and firm performance: Evidence from South Africa," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 140-151.
    10. Hussein Abedi Shamsabadi & Byung-Seong Min & Richard Chung, 2016. "Corporate governance and dividend strategy: lessons from Australia," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(5), pages 583-610, October.
    11. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    12. James, Hui & Benson, Bradley W. & Wu, Chen (Ken), 2017. "Does CEO ownership affect payout policy? Evidence from using CEO scaled wealth-performance sensitivity," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 328-345.
    13. Juan Manuel San Martín Reyna, 2012. "An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure, Earnings Management and Growth Opportunities in Mexican Market," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 2(7), pages 103-123, December.
    14. Ruben Arrondo & Silvia Gomez-Anson, 2003. "A study of Spanish firms' security issue decision under asymmetric information and agency costs," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(10), pages 771-782.
    15. Aziz Jaafar & Lynn Hodgkinson & Mao-Feng Kao, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Board of Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan," Working Papers 19011, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    16. Grzegorz Pawlina & Luc Renneboog, 2005. "Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(4), pages 483-513, September.
    17. Wu, Xueping & Wang, Zheng, 2005. "Equity financing in a Myers-Majluf framework with private benefits of control," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 915-945, October.
    18. Trojanowski, G., 2004. "Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance," Other publications TiSEM 5dbc874d-d1d0-44a5-9717-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Aiyesha Dey, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(5), pages 1143-1181, December.
    20. Ferreira, Daniel & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Raposo, Clara C., 2011. "Board structure and price informativeness," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 523-545, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; ownership structure; competition; firm valuation; endogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2004/01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: WWZ (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wwzbsch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.