Friends and Enemies: A Model of Signed Network Formation
I propose a game of signed network formation, where agents make friends to coerce payoffs from enemies with fewer friends. The model accounts for the interplay between friendship and enmity. Nash equilibrium configurations are such that, either everyone is friends with everyone, or agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are friends and agents in different sets are enemies. These results mirror findings of a large body of work on signed networks in sociology, social psychology, international relations and applied physics.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2012|
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- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2010.
"The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1258, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013. "The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 937-956, April.
- Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
- Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2007. "Structural holes in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 460-492, November.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
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