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The Big Con – Reassessing the "Great" Recession and its "Fix"

Author

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  • Laurence J. Kotlikoff

    (Boston University, The Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, and NBER)

Abstract

Most economists differ, not on the causes of the Great Recession, but on their relative importance. They concur, though, on the basic problem, namely human, not market failure. This study applies the evidence, some new, some old, to re-try the usual suspects. It finds none guilty. Instead, it identifies broadly defined multiple equilibrium, mediated by opacity, false rumors, and panic, as the real culprit. There are many models of bank runs. But each can trigger firing runs – firing someone else’s customers for fear that others are firing your customers. Firing runs, in turn, exacerbate bank runs, producing a vicious cycle. This cycle can be manipulated by those who benefit from economic distress (short sellers). If the banking system, not the banking players is the problem, the solution surely lies in fundamental banking reform. This paper concludes by pointing out that a reform that shifted to 100 percent, equity-financed mutual-fund banking with government-organized, real-time asset verification and disclosure could preclude financial runs and their ability to induce firing runs.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 2018. "The Big Con – Reassessing the "Great" Recession and its "Fix"," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-311, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-311
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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