On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation
We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels.
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- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
- Miller, Nolan H & Pazgal, Amit I, 2001. "The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 284-301, Summer.
- Matthew J. Clayton & Bjorn N. Jorgensen, 2005. "Optimal Cross Holding with Externalities and Strategic Interactions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1505-1522, July.
- J. W. Friedman, 1968. "Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 257-272.
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