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The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent W. Slaugh

    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Mustafa Akan

    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Onur Kesten

    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • M. Utku Ünver

    (Boston College)

Abstract

The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange (PAE) helps case workers representing children in state custody by recommending prospective families for adoption. We describe PAE's operational challenges using case worker surveys and a regression analysis of data on child outcomes over multiple years. Using a discrete-event simulation of PAE, we justify the value of a statewide adoption network and demonstrate the importance of the family preference information quality on the percentage of children who successfully nd adoptive placements. Finally, we detail a series of simple improvements implemented by PAE to increase the adoptive placement rate through collecting more valuable information, improving the family ranking algorithm, and aligning incentives for families to provide useful preference information.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent W. Slaugh & Mustafa Akan & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2014. "The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 858, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 14 Nov 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:858
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Coles & John Cawley & Phillip B. Levine & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & John J. Siegfried, 2010. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 187-206, Fall.
    2. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Allan Collard-Wexler & Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv, 2014. "Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-158, July.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    4. Soohyung Lee & Muriel Niederle, 2015. "Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 731-755, December.
    5. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers 2023-19, Banco de México.
    2. Terence Highsmith Ii, 2024. "Matching Design with Algorithms and Applications to Foster Care," Papers 2411.12860, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
    3. Dashi I Singham & Jennifer Lucky & Stephanie Reinauer, 2023. "Discrete-event simulation modeling for housing of homeless populations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(4), pages 1-18, April.
    4. Priyank Arora & Wei Wei & Senay Solak, 2021. "Improving Outcomes in Child Care Subsidy Voucher Programs under Regional Asymmetries," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(12), pages 4435-4454, December.
    5. Terence Highsmith, 2024. "Dynamic Envy-Free Permanency in Child Welfare Systems," Papers 2411.09817, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    6. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 0. "Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    7. Delorme, Maxence & García, Sergio & Gondzio, Jacek & Kalcsics, Jörg & Manlove, David & Pettersson, William, 2019. "Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 277(2), pages 426-441.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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