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A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions

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  • Terence Highsmith

Abstract

Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design mechanisms satisfying fairness and limited strategy-proofness. They also avoid costly patience. Our empirically-based simulations suggest the mechanisms could increase adoptions by at least 25% versus the status quo. A naive dynamic extension of Deferred Acceptance does not attain these benefits. Our mechanisms sidestep direct preference elicitation by predicting preferences, and they are robust to prediction error.

Suggested Citation

  • Terence Highsmith, 2024. "A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions," Papers 2411.09817, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2411.09817
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vincent W. Slaugh & Mustafa Akan & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2016. "The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 133-153, April.
    2. Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers 2023-19, Banco de México.
    3. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Allan Collard-Wexler & Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv, 2014. "Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-158, July.
    4. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-427, March.
    5. Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach," Working Papers 2023-01, Banco de México.
    6. E. Jason Baron & Richard Lombardo & Joseph P. Ryan & Jeongsoo Suh & Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024. "Mechanism Reform for Task Allocation," NBER Working Papers 32369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Terence Highsmith Ii, 2024. "Matching Design with Algorithms and Applications to Foster Care," Papers 2411.12860, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.

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