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Dynamic Envy-Free Permanency in Child Welfare Systems

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  • Terence Highsmith

Abstract

Caseworkers in foster care systems seek to place waiting children in the most suitable homes. Furthermore, social work guidelines prioritize heterogeneous attributes of children and homes when deliberating placements. We use insights from market design and dynamic matching to characterize a class of dynamically envy-free mechanisms that incentivize expedient placements when children and homes arrive to the market over time and homes may accept or decline placements. The mechanisms have robustness against justified envy and costly patience. We analyze strategic incentives and efficiency properties of dynamic envy-freeness. Finally, we conduct empirical simulations that affirm that our mechanisms drastically increase placements and reduce waiting costs while maintaining robustness to prediction error versus a naive mechanism that always sequentially runs Deferred Acceptance. Practitioners can implement our mechanisms through assigning priority to child-home matches.

Suggested Citation

  • Terence Highsmith, 2024. "Dynamic Envy-Free Permanency in Child Welfare Systems," Papers 2411.09817, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2411.09817
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    1. Vincent W. Slaugh & Mustafa Akan & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2016. "The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 133-153, April.
    2. Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers 2023-19, Banco de México.
    3. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Allan Collard-Wexler & Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv, 2014. "Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-158, July.
    4. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-427, March.
    5. Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach," Working Papers 2023-01, Banco de México.
    6. E. Jason Baron & Richard Lombardo & Joseph P. Ryan & Jeongsoo Suh & Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024. "Mechanism Reform: An Application to Child Welfare," NBER Working Papers 32369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Terence Highsmith Ii, 2024. "Matching Design with Sufficiency and Applications to Child Welfare," Papers 2411.12860, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.

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