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Reforming Rotations

Author

Listed:
  • E. Jason Baron
  • Richard Lombardo
  • Joseph P. Ryan
  • Jeongsoo Suh
  • Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey

Abstract

In many settings, tasks are assigned to agents via a rotation. Such quasi-random allocation ignores heterogeneity in agents’ performance and preferences. We study how a designer can exploit such heterogeneity to improve aggregate performance while simultaneously ensuring that no agent is worse off relative to the status-quo system. The key challenge is that, while the designer may be able to estimate agents’ performance, their preferences are inherently unobservable. We develop a mechanism-design framework to study this problem and characterize optimal mechanisms in both static and dynamic settings. Optimal mechanisms can be interpreted as competitive equilibria in which agents trade tasks facing personalized, kinked budget sets. As an illustration, we apply our results to the assignment of Child Protective Services investigators to maltreatment cases. Simulations show that the mechanism reduces false positives (unnecessary foster care placements) by up to 14% while also lowering false negatives (missed maltreatment cases) and overall placements.

Suggested Citation

  • E. Jason Baron & Richard Lombardo & Joseph P. Ryan & Jeongsoo Suh & Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024. "Reforming Rotations," NBER Working Papers 32369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32369
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    Cited by:

    1. Terence Highsmith Ii, 2024. "Matching Design with Algorithms and Applications to Foster Care," Papers 2411.12860, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    2. Terence Highsmith, 2024. "A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions," Papers 2411.09817, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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