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Report NEP-DES-2024-05-27
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Derek Neal & Joseph Root, 2024, "The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32378, Apr.
- Alexander L. Brown & Daniel G. Stephenson & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2024, "Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2404.11883, Apr.
- Cemil Selcuk, 2024, "Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2404.08762, Apr.
- Günnur Ege Bilgin, 2024, "Decentralized Many-to-One Matching With Random Search," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_541, Apr.
- Adam Kapor, 2024, "Transparency and Percent Plans," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32372, Apr.
- E. Jason Baron & Richard Lombardo & Joseph P. Ryan & Jeongsoo Suh & Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024, "Reforming Rotations," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32369, Apr.
- Mario Ghossoub & Giulio Principi & Ruodu Wang, 2024, "Allocation Mechanisms in Decentralized Exchange Markets with Frictions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2404.10900, Apr, revised Mar 2026.
- Bahel, Eric & Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2024, "Merge-proofness and cost solidarity in shortest path games," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120606.