Utilitarianism and Discrimination
Since Becker (1971), a common argument against asymmetric norms that promote minority rights over those of the majority is that such policies reduce total welfare. While this may be the case, we show that there are simple environments where aggregate sum of individual utilities is actually maximized under asymmetric norms that favor minorities. We thus maintain that without information regarding individual utilities one cannot reject or promote segregation-related policies based on utilitarian arguments.
|Date of creation:||19 Feb 2012|
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- Christopher Avery & Susan Athey & Peter Zemsky, 2000.
"Mentoring and Diversity,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 765-786, September.
- Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 2, number 9780226041162.
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