Ranking Ranking Rules
Transitivity is a fundamental requirement for consistency. Legal systems, especially when composed over time and by different agencies, may encounter non-transitive cycles. This paper discusses a new solution to such cycles, namely setting the hierarchy of the relevant rules or preferences. The hierarchy determines the sequence of applying the rules or preferences, and thus enables avoiding non-transitive cycles. The paper provides a formal generalization of this solution, and demonstrates its possible implementation to anti-discrimination laws. It is also shown that this solution can be traced to the Rabbinic literature, starting with the Mishnah and the Talmud (1st–5th c CE).
|Date of creation:||03 Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:||27 Feb 2012|
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- Ariel Rubinstein, 2006. "Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number gradmicro1.
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